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jurisdiction to grant H a divorceP' and also has jurisdiction to award
the custody of C.0
(b) Husband, Wife and Child are domiciled in state X. W goes
to state Y and sues for a divorce, H being at fault. H does not appear.
State Y does not have jurisdiction to award the custody of C.
(3) Husband, Wife and Child are domiciled in state X. H (or W)
obtains a divorce and C is awarded to his (or her) custody. The party
not entitled to custody abducts C and flees to state Y, establishing residence. The party entitled to custody brings habeas corpus for possession of C in state Y. State Y has jurisdiction to alter the award previously given upon a showing of changed conditions."
W. L. M.&Trws, J.
PROCESS SERVICE ON RESIDENT AGENT OF NON-RESIDENT.
IS SEC. 51-6 OF THE KENTUCKY CIVIL CODE
CONSTITUTIONAL?
The Kentucky Court of Appeals referred in a recent decisionl to a
prior case which declared that see. 51-6 of the Civil Code providing for
substituted service upon the agent of a nonresident individual or
partnership doing business within the state in actions against the
The judicial treatment of that
nonresident was unconstitutional.
section is very interesting, since both the Supreme Court of the
United States and the Kentucky Court of Appeals have changed their
"Elwood Rosenbaum, ExtraterritorialValidity of Ex Parte Divorces, (1940) 28 Ky. L. J. 247, 249.
"Lanning v. Gregory, 100 Tex. 310, 99 S.W. 542, 544 (1907) states
that the state which is the domicile of the child and the domicile of the
father is the state entitled to award custody. Although the illustration used is composed of somewhat different facts, it is readily seen
that the domicile of the child follows the domicile of the father until
it has been legally given to the other parent; therefore it is in state Y.
2'No case has been found involving this particular point, but by
analogy to the cases cited it would seem that C's domicile remained
in state X with the father until the mother was entitled legally to its
custody. There had been no previous award of custody; therefore the
wife must seek her divorce at the domicile of the child if the court
awarding the divorce is to have jurisdiction to award the child.
2Kenner v. Kenner, 139 Tenn. 211, 201 S.W. 779 (1917); The
significant factor in this situation is that there has been a previous
decree in another state and the jurisdiction taken goes only to altering
such a decree.
'-Jones v. Fuller, 280 Ky. 671, 134 S.W. (2d) 240 (1939).
2
Andrews Bros. v. McClanahan, 220 Ky. 504, 295 S.W. 457 (1927).
3Ky. Civic Code (Carroll's 1938) sec. 51-6. "In actions against an
individual residing in another state, or a partnership, association, or
joint stock company, the members of which reside in another state,
engaged in business in this State, the summons may be served on the
manager, or agent of, or person in charge of, such business in this
State, in the county where the business is carried on, or in the county
where the cause of action accrued."

STUDENT NOTES

position on the question. The point raised by the statute has also been
the subject of extended comment by learned writers.'
The Kentucky decisions up to 1927 were uniform In upholding
the constitutionality of the provision for substituted service of a
nonresident defendant under the circumstances set out in the Act
However, In 1919, the United States Supreme Court passed on the question In the case of Flexner v. Farson,6 which arose in the following
manner: Plaintiff brought an action of debt in Illinois on a Kentucky
money judgment, for which the cause of action had arisen in Kentucky. Defendants, the same in both suits, were nonresidents of Kentucky, but had been doing business there as partners through one
Flexner as an agent. The plaintiff in the Kentucky action served the
defendants by directing summons to Flexner, purportedly under sec.
51-6, but after he had ceased to act as agent for the defendants. Plaintiff obtained judgment by default on defendants' failing to appear. In
the suit on the Kentucky judgment in Illinois, the court held for the
defendants. An appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States
on the basis of a denial of full faith and credit followed.
Although, as has been pointed out by eminent writers,7 it was
possible to hold the Kentucky judgment void on the ground that the
service statute had not been complied with because Flexner was no
longer defendants' agent when served, it has been suggested that the
Court placed its decision that the judgment was not entitled to full
foith and credit on the unconstitutionality of the statute. In holding
fur the defendants the Court (opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes) said:8
"But the consent that is said to be implied in such cases
(where the nonresident defendant is a corporation) is a mere fiction, founded upon the accepted doctrine that the states could
exclude foreign corporations altogether, and therefore could establish this obligation (consent to substituted service on resident
manager) as a condition to letting them in. . . . The State had
no power to exclude the defendants and on that ground without
going further the Supreme Court of Illinois rightly held that the
analogy failed, and that the Kentucky judgment was void."
This case was followed by Andrews Bros. v. McClanahanP in which
the Kentucky Court of Appeals held substituted service as provided by
'Beale, The Conflict of Laws (1935) sec. 84.3, et seq.; Stumberg,
Conflict of Laws (1937) p. 92, et seq.; Scott, Jurisdiction Over Yonresidents Doing Business Within a State (1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 871;
Beale, Progress of the Law 1918-1919 (1919) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 12;
Scott, JurisdictionOver Nonresident Motorists (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev.
563, 583; Comment (1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1433.
5 Consult the annotations following Ky. Civil Code (Carroll's 1938)
sec. 51-6.
8248 U. S. 289, 63 L. ed. 250, 39 Sup. Ct. 97 (1919).
TBeale, The Conflict of Laws (1935) sec. 84.3; Stumberg, Conflict
of Laws (1937) p. 94; Scott, JurisdictionOver Nonresidents Doing Business Within a State (1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 871, 890-891; Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Motorists (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 563, 583.
8248 U.S. 239, 293, 63 L. ed. 250, 253, 39 Sup. Ct. 97, (1919).
'220 Ky. 504, 295 S.W. 457 (1927).
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sec. 51-6 inoperative, citing the United States Supreme Court's ruling
in Flexner v. Farson to sustain that result. The service in the former
case was in accordance with the Code provision, since the person
served was at the time of service the agent of the defendant.
The next decision in the history of the litigation centering about
the provision for substituted service was the Supreme Court case of
0
Doherty v. Goodman.?
This controversy involved an Iowa statute,"
substantially similar to the Kentucky statute, and so distinguished the
Flexner case that it is worthy of consideration here. H. L. Doherty,
a resident of New York doing business as Doherty and Co., operated
an office in Des Moines, Iowa, for the purpose of selling corporate
securities. One King was at the time of the suit In charge of this
office as district manager. Suit was brought in Iowa against Doherty
individually, and service was had on King, as permitted by an Iowa
statute providing for service upon an agent of an indivdiual having an
office for business within the state. The United States Supreme Court
upheld the validity of this service, saying of Flexner v. Farson:'"
"(It) . . . does not sustain appellant's position.
There the
service was made upon one not then agent for the defendants;
here the situation is different. King was manager of appellant's
office when the sale contract was made; also when process was
served upon him."
The Cour intimated that the basis of its decision In the Doherty case
was that the statute was a valid exercise of the police power of the
state:
"Iowa treats the business of dealing in corporate securities as
exceptional and subjects it to special regulation." ". . . under the
laws of Iowa, neither her citizens nor nonresidents
could freely
engage in the business of selling securities." 1'
This case would seem to support the view that a state has the
power to provide that service on the resident agent of the nonresident
partnership or individual doing business within the state raises a duty
to respond as to causes of action arising out of that business and within
the state.15 The factors making this exercise of power reasonable are
10294 U.S. 623, 79 L. ed. 1097, 55 Sup. Ct. 553 (1925).
"Sec. 11079, Ia. Code (1927, 1931): "When a corporation, company,
or individual has, for the transaction of any business, an office or
agency in any county other than that in which the principal resides,
service may be made on any agent or clerk employed in such office or
agency, in all actions growing out of, or connected with the business
of that office or agency."
12294 U.S. 623, 628, 79 L. ed. 1097, 1099, 55 Sup. Ct. 553, (1935).
3 Id. at 627 U.S., 1099 L. ed.
"Id. at 628 U.S., 1099 L. ed.
1 Stumberg, op. cit. supra, n. 3, at p. 95, states in a rather general
way the effect of the Doherty case: "It would seem from this case that
the doing of business within a state, which as an exceptional business
is subject to regulation, is sufficient to confer jurisdiction over an
individual through service upon his agent." In footnote six on the
same page: "The idea here is not power to exclude nor power to regulate because of- dangerous character, but power to regulate In general
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set out by Scott as follows:16 1) Many such businesses are carried on
without assets within the state and satisfaction of claims by attachment Is impossible. 2) It is a hardship on the resident creditor for
him to have to seek out the debtor in another state because such procedure would often make the cost of the remedy exceed its fruits.
3) There Is little hardship on the business owner in requiring him to
answer claims arising from the business where it is carried on. Scott
concludes that the result of refusing a remedy in such local suits would
be immunity from legal responsibility.
One would assume that the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in deciding
the next case involving the validity of service under sec. 51-6, would
follow the Supreme Court's lead in the Doherty case by holding such
service valid, thus Ignoring its statement in the Andrews case that the
section was unconstitutional. The precise point has not been in issue.
but the Court has in two fairly recent cases commented on the validity
of the provision without reference to the Doherty case.
7
In Greene v. Commonwealth, By Marshall, Sheriff,2
decided three
years after the Doherty case, the Court cited the Flexner and Andrews
cases in support of its decision against validity of service. The decision
should have been based solely upon the plaintiff's failure to make the
service required by the statute. The following statement appears in
Jones v. Fuller:8
"(Service on the resident agent) was certainly not sufficient to
have warranted the rendition of a judgment against appellee (nonresident) as an individual had he been sued as such, since subsection 6 of the (Civil Code sec. 51) has been held unconstitutional."
The Court cited the Greene case above to support this dictum.
Another point remains to be considered in the determination of
the constitutionality of the section under consideration." The Iowa
statute approved in the Doherty case limited substituted service to
"...
all actions growing out of, or connected with the business of that
office or agency (i.e. the one served)." The Kentucky provision reads:
"In actions against an individual residing in another state .... ." It
should be noted that the Iowa statute requires two things before substituted service may be had: a) th cause of action must arise within
with the cause of action arising out of the business or, perhaps, a transaction in the state which is within its regulatory power."
18Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents Doing Business Within a
State (1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 871, 888.
17275 Ky. 637, 122 S.W. (2d) 523 (1938).
(Not in point because
the person served was not at the time of service in the employment of
the nonresident defendant, nor was the latter engaged in business in
the state.)
1 280 Ky. 671, 134 S.W. (2d) 240, 242 (1939).
"It may be urged that since there is no provision in the Kentucky
statutes for any form of constructive service on residents in in personam
proceedings, the statute under consideration is unconstitutional as a
denial of privileges and immunities. This contention is met by the
fact that the discrimination is based on residence, not citizenship and
Is therefore reasonable. See Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents
Doing Business within a State (1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 871, 889.
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the state and b) out of business conducted within the state. The Kentucky Act is not so limited.
The distinction may best be pointed out by example. A, citizen and
resident of Ohio, operates a motor sales agency in Kentucky. He negligently drives his automobile in Illinois so as to injure B. Under the
terms of the Kentucky section, B could in suing A, serve the resident
manager of A's motor sales agency while such service under the Iowa
statute is invalid. The following situation In Kentucky would be valid
service and invalid in Iowa: The accident occurs while the nonresident
owner is on a pleasure trip in the state where the business is located,
and service is had on the resident agent.
Does the fact that the scope of the Kentucky provision is not
limited by its terms to causes of action arising within the state out of
business conducted therein make it so unreasonable as to be an invalid
exercise of police power? It is believed that it does, and that as applied
to causes of action arising outside the state and or unconnected with
the business carried on within the state it is unconstitutional. However, it should be regarded as severable, and valid as to causes of action
arising within the state out of business carried on therein. It is urged
that that conclusion, which is supported by Professor Scott,' is the
correct one, and should be adopted by the Kentucky Court of Appeals
should this point rise again.
-J. PAUL CURRY

COVENANTS

NOT TO COMPETE IN KENTUCKY

Actions for damages for breach of contracts not to compete and
suits for injunctions restraining the breach of such contracts reaching the Court of Appeals of Kentucky have been very numerous; and
the decisions of that Court have shown a remarkable uniformity in the
treatment of such cases. In its decisions, the court states that though
the common law applying to contracts in restraint of trade is in force
in this state the rigor of the early rule that any contract which tended
to restrain trade was void has long since been relaxed; and that the
rule governing such contracts may be stated as follows: Covenants
in partial restraint of trade are valid when they are agreements by a
seller of business not to compete with the buyer in such a way as to
decrease the value of the business; by a retiring partner not to compete
with the firm; by a retiring partner not to do anything to hinder the
" Scott Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents Doing Business Within a
State (1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 871, 890. Scott is supported in his general conclusions by Beale, op. cit. supra n. 3, sec. 84.3, p. 363-4. See
also Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Motorists (1926) 39 Harv.
L. Rev. 563, 583. Cf. Beale, Progress of the Law (1919) 33 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 12; Stumberg, op. cit. supra n. 3, p. 95, n. 6. (Quoted in n. 14,
supra); Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) secs. 84, 85. See also,
Comment (1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1433, 1434.
1 Scobee v. Brent, 185 Ky. 734, 216 S. W. 76 (1919); Elkins v. Barclay, 243 Ky. 144, 47 S. W. (2d) 945 (1932).

